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Abstract 
Recently Gottlob proved [2] that there does not exist a faithful modular translation of default 
logic into autoepistemic logic, and presented a non-modular translation. Gottlob’s translation, 
however, is indirect (it uses “nonmonotonic logic N” as an intermediate point), quite complex 
and exploitlj sophisticated encoding of proof theory in autoepistemic formulas. We provide a 
simpler and more intuitive (non-modular) direct translation. In addition, our argument is purely 
model-theoretic. 
1. Introduction 
Since Konolige’s paper [4] much work has been done in attempts to provide a 
faithful translation of default logic [ 121 into Moore’s autoepistemic logic [ll]. The 
reason, aplparently, was, that at the first look, Moore’s logic seems to be clearly more 
general than Reiter’s default logic: it, in a sense, “descends” defaults from the meta- 
level to the object level. In Reiter’s logic, defaults are rules of inference; the language 
of Moore’s logic is the usual language of classical modal logic, and the default rules 
are represented as usual modal formulas. 
Konolige [4] suggested the following translation of default logic into the modal 
language. To each default of the form 
,=ri,:th,...Jb”, 
(1) 
rl 
he assigns a modal formula Lp A MI/Q A . . . A M$,,, > 7. 
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Unfortunately, it turned out that Konolige’s translation, although being intuitive, does 
not give a faithful embedding of default logic into Moore’s logic. In order to get the 
faithfulness, Konolige introduced the notion of a “strongly grounded expansion”, which 
is not very intuitive. It is not invariant w.r.t. propositional equivalence, and, basically, 
mimics the rule-based nature of Reiter’s logic, thus eliminating main advantages of 
Moore’s logic-its unifo~ity and purely logical character. 
Moore’s logic was introduced as a refinement of nonmonotonic modal logics intro- 
duced by McDermott and Doyle [9] and later generalized by McDermott [ 81. Later 
[ 161 it was shown that, formally, Moore’s logic is a special case of McDermott-Doyle 
style nonmonotonic modal logics, namely it is nonmonotonic logic based on the modal 
logic KD45. The family of McDe~ott-Doyle style nonmonotonic logics was investi- 
gated in [6, 13, 161, and it turns out that by changing the underlying monotonic modal 
logic we get nonmonotonic logics which work not worse than Moore’s autoepistemic 
logic, and overcome many of the difficulties of the original Moore’s logic. Truszczyliski 
[ 171 modified Konolige’s ~~slation and showed that the modified translation f~thfully 
embeds default logic into nonmonotonic modal logic 5, for a wide class of modal logics 
S, namely, for each S contained in the logic S4F and enjoying the necessitation rule. 
Logics of this kind include, in particular, such popular logics as S4, K, T. 
Thus, in this respect (and in some others too-see [ 14,161) Moore’s autoepistemic 
logic is among a few inappropriate nonmonotonic modal logics, whereas almost every 
other nonmonotonic modal logic would work. 
Nevertheless, Moore’s autoepistemic logic still remains the most popular among non- 
monotonic modal logics. I think that the reason is, besides obvious historical reasons, 
that it is defined in terms of usual propositional consequence, without referring to any 
particular modal system. 
Gottlob [ 23 demonstrated that the “purely propositional” nature of the autoepistemic 
logic is, probably, the main reason for difficulties in embedding the default logic into 
Moore’s autoepistemic logic. Namely, a translation is called modular if for any default 
theory, the translation of the theory is the union of translations of all its defaults and 
axioms. Gottlob proved that a modular faithful translation of default logic into Moore’s 
autoepistemic logic does not exist. Because researchers are usually looking for a modular 
translation, and modular translations are most natural, the reason for failure to find a 
translation of the default logic into Moore’s autoepistemic logic becomes clear. And the 
crucial point in Gottlob’s proof is the use of the deduction theorem for propositional 
logic. Because the deduction theorem in its usual form fails for modal logics, it is clear 
that the “propositional nature” of Moore’s logic is essential here. 
At the same time, Gottlob presented a non-modular translation of default logic into 
autoepistemic logic. In other words, we have to transform the default theory as a whole, 
not as a sum of translations of its elements. 
Gottlob’s translation is based on the following idea. Truszczyriski’s translation faith- 
fully transforms a default theory V into a modal theory tr( D). A theory T is an extension 
of D if and only if T is the objective part of an S-expansion of @(Y&Q)>>, for S being the 
modal logic N of “pure necessitation”. 
Gottlob builds a non-modular translation of nonmonotonic N into Moore’s a.e. logic 
(nonmonotonic KD45), and takes the composition of the two translations. The transla- 
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tion of nonmonotonic N into nonmonotonic KD45 has the following form: For a given 
finite set of formulas 2, the translation of 2 is a theory 2 U {LG( Z)}, where G( _X) 
is a complicated formula, which includes additional propositional variables and encodes 
in some tricky way deductive properties of the modal logic N. The conjunct Z,G( Z), 
in a sense, “destroys” all ungrounded stable expansions of 2, while preserving the 
“grounded” expansions (i.e. those which are also expansions in nonmonotonic modal 
logic N). The formula is quite complex, and for a person unfamiliar with the involved 
proof-theoretic machinery of modal logic N may be difficult to grasp. 
From a mathematical point of view, the main contribution of Gottlob’s [2] is a trans- 
lation of nonmonotonic logic N into autoepistemic logic. Nonmonotonic N is a powerful 
formalism, which was studied by Marek and Truszczyriski [7] and by Schwarz and 
Truszczynski [ 151. Although there exists a model-theoretic characterization of non- 
monotonic N [ 151, it is complicated, involves infinitely many accessibility relations, so 
the use of complicated proof-theoretic machinery by Gottlob seems to be justified. 
The goal of the present note is to show that if we give up modularity, allow the use 
of new variables and do not wish to translate infinite theories, then we can come up 
with a translation of default logic into autoepistemic logic which is much simpler than 
that of Gottlob. Our translation is still quadratic in size and uses auxiliary variables, 
but it is much more intuitive and is, basically, a generalization of Konolige’s translation 
(more exactly, of Chen’s variant of the translation). Plus, our argument is purely model- 
theoretic. 
2. Preliminaries 
We assume familiarity with the basics of default logic [ 121 and autoepistemic logic 
[ 1 11. A reader unfamiliar with these logics may treat results on semantical characteri- 
zation of extensions (stable expansions) of default (autoepistemic) theories, which are 
reproduced below, as definitions. 
Let us recall that a default theory is a pair ( W, D), where W is a set of propositional 
formulas, and D is a set of syntactical constructs of the form ( 1) (called default rules or 
defaults). Formula (p is called prerequisite of the default ( I), &‘s are called justi$cutions 
and v is called the conclusion of (1). A default can contain no prerequisite, in which 
case rp is absent from ( I), or no justifications, which correspond to m = 0 in ( 1). In 
this paper we, following Gottlob [2], always assume W and D to be finite. 
A langtrage of autoepistemic logic is obtained from the propositional language by 
adding a modal belief operator L. A modal operator M is an abbreviation for ~L-T. 
We assume that our basic propositional language contains infinitely many propositional 
variables. So when we speak about “new propositional variables” in the context of a 
given set of formulas, we mean variables from our language which do not appear in the 
formulas trnder discussion in the context. 
First, we recall a semantical characterization of default logic by Guereiro and Casanova 
[31. 
A (propositional) interpretation (or a world) is an assignment of usual truth values to 
all propositional variables. Let (I, J) be a pair of sets of propositional interpretations. A 
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default d = y is true in (I, J) if, whenever q is true in all the interpretations of J, 
and each of $i is true in some interpretation in I, then 7 is true in all the interpretations 
in J. A formula TZ is true in (I, .Z) if it is true in all the interpretations in J. We will use 
the notation (I, .Z) k d to denote that a default (or a formula) d is true in (I, J), and 
(I, J) j= 23 to denote that all defaults and axioms of V are true in (I, J). By I k 40 we 
denote that a propositional formula p is valid in all the interpretations from I. 
A set of interpretations I is a model of a default theory V if Z is a maximal set J 
such that (I, J) k V. 
Proposition 2.1 ( [ 31) . T is an extension of 2, if and only if T = (4p : I k 40) for some 
model I of V. 
Notice that Proposition 2.1 includes the case of an inconsistent extension, when I = 0. 
Clearly, Z is a default model of V if and only if (I, I) k V, and for no .Z > I, 
(I, J) k V. The following simple lemma shows that we can restrict the cardinalities of 
the J’s. 
Lemma 2.2. Let V be a default theory containing k defaults with prerequisites. Then 
I is a default model of V if and only if (I, I) b V, and for all J > I such that the 
cardinality of J \ I does not exceed max( 1, k), (I, J) p V. 
Proof. It is sufficient to show that for each K > Z such that (I, K) b V, there is J 
such that I c J C K, 1 J \ II < max( 1, k) and (I, J) b 2). For each prerequisite cp of a 
default in D such that for some (Y E K \ I, (Y p 9, fix some CY~ with this property. Let 
J be the union of I and the set of all such a,+,; if for all prerequisites of all defaults, 
and for all LY E K \ I, (Y k p, then put J = Z U {a} for an arbitrary (Y in K \ I. It is 
straightforward to show that (I, J) /= 2). Cl 
A similar characterization exists for autoepistemic logic, tracing back to Moore [ IO], 
and appearing in a more clear form in Levesque [5]. Namely, for a modal formula p, 
an interpretation (Y and a set of interpretations Z (not necessarily containing a), the 
relation (I, (u) + p is defined in the following natural way: For an atom p, (I, (Y) b p 
iff p is true in cu; (I, cu) /= cp A (V)@ if (I, a) k 40 and (or) (I, cr) k @; (I, cu) k -@ 
if (I, cu) p @; finally, (I, a) k Lp iff for each p E I, (Z,p) k rp. As usual, for an 
autoepistemic formula p and a set Z of propositional interpretations, Z k Lrp means that 
for each a E I, (I, a) k Lp. A set of interpretations, I, is called an autoepistemic 
model of an autoepistemic theory A, if Z = {Q : (I, a) k A}. 
Proposition 2.3 ( [ 5, lo] ). T is a stable expansion of A if and only if for some au- 
toepistemic model I of A, T = (9 : I k 5p). 
Again, the case of an inconsistent stable expansion is captured here by I = 8. 
Next we recall Chen’s translation [ 11. This is the following modification of the 
Konolige translation: Default rule ( 1) is translated into the autoepistemic formula 
Lp A (D A M& A . . . A M&, > 7. (2) 
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Chen proved that this translation is faithful for prerequisite-free default theories 
(which is true for Konolige’s translation too-for prerequisite-free theories the two 
translations coincide), and for default theories in which all the prerequisites and con- 
clusions are conjunctions of literals. In fact, by using the technique of this paper, it 
is possible to show that Chen’s translation is faithful if all the prerequisites are con- 
junctions of literals, or if a default theory contains no more than one default with a 
prerequisite. 
We will denote the formula (2) by C(d), if d is a default rule ( 1) . (If a default has 
no prerequisite, then its Chen’s translation coincides with Konolige’s translation.) Given 
the default theory (W,D) Chen’s translation C(D) is defined as WU {C(d) : d E D}. 
If both IV and D are finite, then we denote by C(D) the conjunction of W with all the 
members of C(D). 
The following simple lemma immediately follows from the definitions and explains 
why we have to use Chen’s translation rather than Konolige’s one. 
Lemma 2.4. Let I be a set of interpretations, let V be a default theory, LY be an 
arbitrary propositional interpretation. Then (I, I U {a}) k 2) if and only if (I, /3) k 
C(D) for each p E I U {a}. 
3. New tramslation 
Let 2) = (IY D) be a finite default theory. Because W is finite, we can assume that 
W is just one formula. Let D contain exactly k + 1 defaults with prerequisites, k > -1. 
That is 1) can also have any number of prerequisite-free defaults. 
Let PI, . . . ,pn be a complete list of propositional variables appearing in D. Let us 
fix max( k, 0) additional lists of new propositional variables, of ,. . . ,pL, 1 < i < k. 
(That is, if all the defaults except maybe one, are prerequisite-free, we do not have any 
additional variables; otherwise for each default with a prerequisite in excess of one, we 
create copies of original variables.) 
For a formula 5, all of whose variables are among ~1,. . . ,p,,, by g(p’) we denote 
the result of the substitution of the variables of ,. . . , pi for the variables pt ,. . . , p,, in 
5. Sometimes 5 will be denoted by c(p) for better clarity. For each default d E D, 
by t(d) we denote 
(If the default is prerequisite-free, we do not have premises Lq A 9 A . . . A cp(pk) in 
this formula.) 
We are ready to define our translation t( ‘D) : 
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r(D) = C(D) v WA W(p’) A. *. A W(g) A A t(d) . 
dED 
Example 3.1. Let a default theory consist of the single default $---a famous example 
showing that Konolige’s translation does not work. Our translation of this theory is 
(Lp A p > p) V (Lp A p > p) (clearly, if we have a single default, our translation 
does not have any additional variables). Compare with Gottlob’s translation of this 
theory: 
U((([Wl ~P”)A(~~P~~~~P’l)A(u,,>~Lp’l))>(Lp>~LpZl)).V. 
(-u,,A((t[L~“l IP”)A(YLP 3~[Lp”l)A(u,> 3 [Q”l)) I$‘))), 
where [ Lp” 1, p”, up, [ Lpp] and p” are new propositional variables. 
Example 3.2. Let 2)~ consist of two defaults: y and $. For this theory, neither 
Konolige’s nor Chen’s translation is faithful. Chen’s translation is the conjunction of 
(L(p > q) A (p > q) > p) and Lp A p > q, and has two stable expansions, one of 
them containing p and q is clearly “ungrounded”, and the default theory in question has 
only one extension (set of all tautologies). Our translation of this default theory is the 
disjunction of Chen’s translation and the formula 
(L(p>q)“(p>q)“(pl >qi) >pAp~)A(LpApApl 3qAq1). 
This theory does not have an expansion containing p and q-additional variables in the 
second disjunct “block” the inference of p > q and p from Lp and L(p > q) (which 
was possible for Chen’s translation). Note that Gottlob’s translation of this theory is 
very long and contains 11 additional variables versus just the two we have. 
The above examples do not illustrate the role of the disjunctive term C(D) in the 
translation. Let us consider the default theory of the last example augmented by the 
axiom p. It has the unique extension Th(p, q). Chen’s translation of this theory is 
obtained from Chen’s translation of the theory of the last example by just adding the 
conjunct p. The second disjunct of our translation is like in the previous example, plus 
the conjunct p A ~1. If we had not added disjunctively Chen’s translation, we would 
still have only one stable expansion, but it would contain pl and q1 besides p and q, 
respectively. Adding the Chen disjunct “blocks” the inference of pt and 91, while still 
allowing to derive p and q, which are implied by both the disjuncts of our translation. 
We see that our proposed translation bears a clear structural relationship to the source 
theory, and is structurally similar to Konolige’s and Chen’s translations which both have 
a good underlying intuition. 
Theorem 3.3. Let V be a default theory, Then for each set of propositional sentences 
T, T is an extension of D if and only if T is the objective part of some stable expansion 
of t(D). 
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For the proof of Theorem 3.3, we need first to prove some lemmas. The follow- 
ing lemma immediately follows from our definitions and illustrates the role of Chen’s 
disjunct in our translation. 
Lemma 3.4. Let V = (W, D) be a finite default theory, let t(D) be the translation 
of 2) as defined above. Let I be an autoepistemic model of t(D). Then for all (Y E I, 
(I, a) + C(D). 
Proof. Let PI,. . . ,p,, be a complete list of propositional variables occurring in V. 
Assume, to the contrary, that for some (Y E I, (I, a) p C(D). Then the second disjunct 
of t(D) must hold, that is (I, a) k W A W(p' ) A . . .-hence, a k W, and we must 
have that for some default d E D, (Z,(u) p C(d). Assume that d is of the form (1). 
Because (1, a) k t(D), we necessarily have 
(I,a) +~JUQJA&‘) A-A&) AM,!?’ /“i~..AM+b”’ > 
77 A T(P’) A *.. A V(P? 
and at the same time, 
(3) 
(I, a) i= &o A 40 A Mi,b’ A . . . A MI/“’ 
and cl,(~) F 7. 
(4) 
Hence the only way (3) can be true is, if for some j < k, (1: a) k rp(pj). Let us 
construct a propositional valuation p as follows. Let /3(pt) = cu(p:) for each 1 < 1 < n, 
and let P(,v) = a(p) for all other variables p. We thus have p p rp. Hence, and from 
(4) (because (I, a) + Lsp), we conclude that /3 $! I. 
Furthermore, for each I < k we have p k W( p’) , and p k W (because cr k W ( pi ) ) . 
We also ca.n prove that for each default d E D, (f,/3) k t(d). Indeed, let t(d) have 
the form 
LpAp(p) A/.@) A...Ap(#) AMrl A*..AMrn, > 
5(/7) AUP’) f+*M(pk). 
Since I is an autoepistemic model of t(D), we have (I, a) b t(d). If this relation 
holds because the consequent of t(d) is true in a, then it is also true in p, because 
p( l(p)) q : a(J(pj>>. On the other hand, if this relation holds because one of MT,~ is 
false in (I, cr), then it is trivially false in (I, p), because the truth value of MT,~ depends 
only on I. Further, if this relation holds because for some I, (Y F p(p’), then of course 
/? F p(p)), as LY agrees with /I on these variables. Finally, if a p p or (I, a) p Lp, 
then also (f,a) p Lp (because LYE I>, so we have (1,p) k Lp, and (Z,p) k t(d). 
Thus, we have 
(I,/% k WA VP’) A...A W(#‘) A A t(d), 
dED 
hence (I, 13) /= t( ID), but I is an autoepistemic model of t( Do>, so we must have 
/3 E l-a contradiction. 0 
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Lemma 3.5. Let D = ( W D) be a$nite default theory all whose propositional variables 
are among pl , . . . , p,,. Let t (23) be the translation of 2) as defined above. Let I be an 
autoepistemic model of t(D), and let (Y E 1. Let p be a propositional interpretation 
which agrees with CY on all propositional letters from the list P = pl , . . . , p,,. Then 
p E I. 
Proof. Assume (I, (Y) b t(D). Then, by Lemma 3.4, (I, a) b C(D). Because C(D) 
contains only variables from {PI,. . . , p,}, we have (Z,/?) + C(D), hence (Z,p) + 
t(D), hence /3 E I. 0 
The following is the semantical analogue of the main theorem. 
Lemma 3.6. I is a model of a default theory l3 if and only if I is an autoepistemic 
model of t(V). 
Proof. Let us prove the “only if” part first. 
Assume that Z is a model of ID. By Lemma 2.4, for all LY E I, (I, (Y) b C(D), and 
C (27) is just the first disjunct of t(D) , so (I, a) k t(D). 
Now, assume that for some LY $! I, (Z,(w) b t(D). Then (Z,(u) b C(D) or 
(Z,a) k WA W(p’) A...A W(pk) A A t(d). 
dE:D 
Case I: (Z,(u) b C(D). Then consider J = Z U {a}. By Lemma 2.4, (I, J) b D, 
which contradicts the assumption that Z is a default model of ID. 
Hence, we must have: 
Case 2: 
([,a) k WA W(p’) A...A W(pk) A A t(d). 
LIED 
(5) 
Let us construct a set of interpretations .Z as follows. Let cyu coincide with (Y, and for 
1 < j < k (k + 1 is the number of defaults with prerequisites), let aj (p,) = o(p:i ) , 
I < s < n (n is the number of variables occurring in ‘D), and for the remaining variables 
CY~ may be arbitrary. Put J = I U {LYO, . . . , cq}. Because LYO $ I, J is a proper superset 
of I. We claim that (I, J) b 2). 
First, we have to show that (I, J) /= W. For all y E I, y b W by our assumption. 
Also, LYO coincides with (Y on all the variables in W, so a0 k W by (5). By definition 
of (Y; for i 2 1, ai(W(p)) = o(W(p’)), SO from (5) we have ai b W. 
Now assume d E D, d of the form ( 1). Let us prove that (I, .Z) /= d. Assume for 
all /I E J, p b rp. First of all, it follows immediately that (I, (u) k Lrp holds. Then 
we have for each Lyi, ai k 40, hence cr b cp(p’). Also, because era b cp, we have 
cz + q. If, in addition, for each $,Z there is a world in Z making fij true, we also have 
(I, cu) + M#j e Since we also have (I, a) k t(d), it follows that the consequent of t(d) 
istrueincu,socu~~A~(pt)A+ . .Av(pk), hence for each j we have Lyi b r]. Finally, 
since I is a model of 23, we also have y /= 7 for all y E I, and this concludes the 
proof of (I, J) b d. Because d was an arbitrary default in D, we have (I, J) k D-a 
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contradiction with the assumption that I is a default model of D, which concludes the 
proof of the: “only if’ part. 
For the “if’ part, assume that I is an autoepistemic model of t(D). From Lemma 
3.4 it follows that (f,cu) + C(D) for all cy E I, hence by Lemma 2.4, (1,1) k D. 
Now, assume that I is not a default model of 27. Then by Lemma 2.2, for some set F 
of propositional interpretations disjoint with I, F = {a~, . . . , al}, 0 < 1 < max(O, k), 
(I, I U F) I= D. Then we construct an interpretation LY as follows. I+ cU(pi) = cUo(pi) ; 
for j 6 1, let a(pj) = aj(pi); and finally, for 1 < j < k, let (Y(JJ~) = ao(pi), where 
1 <z<n. 
For each pi, my = cuo(pi), hence, by Lemma 3.5, (Y $ I. Let us show that (I, a) k 
t(D), which will complete the proof by contradiction. We will show that the second 
disjunct in t(D) holds in (I, a). First by definition of (Y, we have a(p:) = ai 
for 0 < j < I,0 < i 6 it, so we have LY + W(p’). Similarly, (Y + W(p) and 
(Y + W(p’) for all j, 1 < j < k. So it remains to prove that for all the defaults d E D, 
(I, a) b t(d) . But if all the premises of t(d) are true, then we easily conclude that cp 
is true in all the worlds in I U F, and each of +i is true somewhere in I, and, because 
(I, I U F) I= d, we obtain that for each i, ai k v, which implies, by our construction 
of a, that LY k 77 Av(p’) A-.- A v(pk), so (I, a) k t(D)-a contradiction with the 
assumption that I is an autoepistemic model of t(D) . 0 
Theorem 3.3 now immediately follows from Propositions 2.1 and 2.3 and Lemma 3.6. 
The idea of our construction is very simple. For models of default logic we have to 
consider an additional set of interpretations (worlds), whereas for autoepistemic models 
only one additional world is allowed. We create copies of all the variables in D, one 
copy for each additional world, and simulate the whole cluster within this one additional 
world. 
Let us call a translation t locally faithful if for each D containing only variables from 
a given list P, T is a stable expansion of t(D) if and only if the restriction of T to 
the propositional language based on P is an extension of V. Then we can drop the dis- 
junct C(D) from our translation, and the simplified translation remains locally faithful. 
(The proofs are essentially the same, even simpler, as we do not need counterparts of 
Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5.) This way, the translation becomes “locally modular” in a sense 
that it is modular for theories with the number of default rules bounded by a given 
constant. 
4. Conclusion 
We constructed a non-modular translation of default logic into autoepistemic logic 
which, we believe, is easier to grasp than Gottlob’s translation. In addition, our moti- 
vations and proofs are purely model-theoretic, whereas Gottlob’s approach was purely 
proof-theoretic. Like Gottlob’s translation, our translation introduces new variables, and 
is quadratic: in size, but the multiplicative constant is much lower. Of course, our trans- 
lation does not make Gottlob’s translation obsolete; the main achievement of Gottlob 
was to translate nonmonotonic logic N (which is, in a sense, the “most grounded” 
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nonmonotonic modal logic) into autoepistemic logic. Our aim was to show that if our 
goal is more modest, then it can be achieved with simpler means. 
It is, apparently, still an open problem whether there exists a non-modular polyno- 
mial translation of default logic into autoepistemic logic which does not introduce new 
variables. 
Acknowledgment 
The author is grateful to Georg Gottlob, who carefully read earlier versions of this 
paper and made numerous useful comments. In particular, initially all the results were 
formulated for consistent extensions and consistent stable expansions; Georg noticed 
that the results remain true (and the proofs continue to hold) in the general case. 
The author is grateful to anonymous referees for exceptionally thorough reviewing 
and numerous suggestions on improving the paper. (The report of one of the referees 
was 15 pages long!) 
The work was performed when the author was visiting the Computer Science Depart- 
ment of the University of California, Riverside. 
References 
1 I 1 J. Chen, The logic of only knowing as a unified framework of nonmonotonic reasoning, Fund. Infi~rm. 
21 ( 1994) 205-220. 
12 I G. Gottlob, The power of beliefs or translating default logic into standard autoepistemic logic, in: 
Proceedings IJCAI-93, Chambery, France (1993) 570-575; extended version: J. ACM 42 (4) ( 1993) 
71 I-740. 
13 I R. Guerrciro and M. Casanova, An alternative semantics for default logic, Preprint, The Third 
International Workshop on Nonmonotonic Reasoning, South Lake Tahoe ( 1990). 
14 1 K. Konolige, On the relation between default and autoepistemic logic, Artif: Intell. 35 ( 1988) 343-382. 
I S I H.J. Levesque, All I know: a study in autoepistemic logic, Artif: Intell. 42 ( 1990) 263-309. 
161 W. Marek, G. Schwarz and M. Truszczyriski, Modal nonmonotonic logics: ranges, characterization, 
computation, J. ACM 40 ( 1993) 963-990. 
17 I W. Marek and M. Truszczytiski, Modal logic for default reasoning, Ann. Math. Art$ Intell. 1 ( 1990) 
275-302. 
18 I D. McDermott, Nonmonotonic logic II: nonmonotonic modal theories, J. ACM 29 ( 1982) 33-57. 
19 I D. McDermott and J. Doyle, Nonmonotonic logic I, Artif Intell. 13 (1980) 41-72. 
I IO\ R.C. Moore, Possible-world semantics autoepistemic logic, in: R. Reiter, ed., Proceedings of the 
Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning ( 1984) 344-354; reprinted in: M. Ginsberg, ed., Readings 
011 Normonotonic Reasoning (Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1987) 137-142. 
1 I I I R.C. Moore, Semantical considerations on non-monotonic logic, Art$ Intell. 25 ( 1985) 75-94. 
1 12 I R. Reiter, A logic for default reasoning, Art$ Intell. 13 (1980) 81-132. 
I I3 I G. Schwarz, Bounding introspection in nonmonotonic logic, in: C. Rich, B. Nebel and W. Swartout, eds., 
Prirzciples of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference 
(KR-92) (Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1992) 581-590. 
I 14 I G. Schwarz and M. Truszczyfiski, Modal logic S4F and the minimal knowledge paradigm, in: Y. Moses, 
ed., Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge. Proceedings of the 4th Conference (TARK 
1992) (Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1992) 184-198. 
I 151 G. Schwarz and M. Truszczydski, Subnormal logics for knowledge representation, in: Proceedings 
AAAI-93, Washington, DC (AAAI Press, 1993) 438-443. 
G. Schwurz/Ar:@cial Intelligence 80 (1996) 349-359 359 
1 161 G.F. Shvarts (G. Schwarz), Autoepistemic modal logics, in: R. Parikh, ed., Theoretical Aspects oj 
Reasoning about Knowledge, Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference (TARK 1990) (Morgan 
Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1990) 97-109. 
1 I7 1 M. Truszczyriski. Embedding default logic into modal nonmonotonic logics. in: W. Marek, A. Nerode 
and V.S. Subramahmanian, eds., Logic Programming and Non-Monotonic Reasoning. Proceedings of the 
Fir.st /nfemntional Workshop (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991) I.5 I- 165. 
